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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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REASON A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED
THIS COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT AVONDET (SKAGGS) DID NOT MAKE A PROPER
ARREST OF McFARLAND SINCE SHE DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-7-6 WHICH REQUIRES
THE PERSON MAKING THE ARREST TO DISCLOSE HER
"INTENTION, CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" BECAUSE
(1) THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THE EXCEPTION TO
SECTION77-7-6 (AS EVIDENCED BY THE SILENCE IN THE
COURT'S OPINION CONCERNING IT) WHICH IS SET FORTH
IN SECTION 77-7-6(2) WHICH PROVIDES THAT A PERSON
NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF "INTENTION,
CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" WHEN THE PERSON BEING
ARRESTED (DETAINED) IS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN THE
COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
(ASSAULT); AND
(2) THIS COURT SHOULD RENDER A DECISION,
ON REHEARING,
(A) WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCEPTION, i.e.,
WHETHER OR NOT McFARLAND WAS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN
THE COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
(ASSAULT) "AT THE TIME AVONDET ARRESTED (DETAINED)
HIM, AND
(B) WITH-RESPECT TO WHETHER THIS ISSUE CAN
BE DECIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR WHETHER IT SHOULD
BE DECIDED BY A JURY ON REMAND.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELWOOD E. McFARLAND,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs. .

Case No. 18352

SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendant/App[ellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Defendant/Appellant Skaggs petitions the Court for a
rehearing pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the following reason:

REASON A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED
THIS COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT AVONDET (SKAGGS) DID NOT MAKE A PROPER
ARREST OF McFARLAND SINCE SHE DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-7-6 WHICH REQUIRES
THE PERSON MAKING THE ARREST TO DISCLOSE HER
"INTENTION, CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" BECAUSE
(1) THlS COURT OVERLOOKED THE EXCEPTION TO
SECTION77-7-6 (AS EVIDENCED BY THE SILENCE IN THE
COURT'S OPINION CONCERNING IT) WHICH IS SET FORTH
IN SECTION 77-7-6(2) WHICH PROVIDES THAT A PERSON
NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF "INTENTION,
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CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" WHEN THE PERSON BEING
ARRESTED (DETAINED) IS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN THE
COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
(ASSAULT); AND
(2) THIS COURT SHOULD RENDER A DECISION,

ON REHEARING,
(A) WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCEPTION, i.e.,
WHETHER OR NOT McFARLAND WAS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN
THE COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
(ASSAULT) "AT THE TIME AVONDET ARRESTED (DETAINED)
HIM, AND
(B) WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER THIS ISSUE CAN
BE DECIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR WHETHER IT SHOULD
BE DECIDED BY A JURY ON REMAND.
1.

This Court held as a matter of law that Anita

Avondet, Skaggs' security officer, did not make a proper arrest for
assault pursuant to §77-7-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because she
did not inform plaintiff/respondent McFarland of her "intention,
cause and authority to arrest (notwithstanding the fact that.£.!:!!_
trial court held as a matter of law that because the arrest was
transitory (in the process of being committed), whether or not it
was a proper arrest was a jury question.

But, where this court

err.-.ed was it did not consider the exception to §77-7-6 which is
set forth in §77-7-6(2), which provides that the requirements of
"intent ion, cause and authority" to arrest "need not be complied
with if the person being arrested is "actually engaging in the
commission of or an attempt to commit the offense (assault) "at the
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time of the arrest or detention.

This exception must be considered

and decided upon in this case.
2.

Both Appellant and Respondent relied on the trial

court decision that this issue was a jury question and pursuant
thereto neither Appellant nor Respondent raised this issue on appeal
nor did Appellant or Respondent brief or argue this issue on appeal
and therefore, Appellant should be given an opportunity, in all
fairness, to brief and argue this issue on rehearing, especially in
light of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court did not render any
decision concerning the exception to §77-7-6.
3.

If this court would allow Appellant to brief and

argue this issue on rehearing, it would realize that it committed
error and an injustice in ruling as a matter of law that the arrest
by Avondet of McFarland for assault, under §77-7-6 was not proper
without rendering any decision concerning the exception ennumerated
in §77-7-6(2) which waives the requirements of "intention, cause
and authority to arrest" if the person arrested or detained,
McFarland, was "actually engaged in the commission of or an attempt
to commit "an assault at the time of his arrest or detention.
(A) §77-7-6 provides as follows:
Manner of making arrest. The person making
the arrest shall inform the person being arrested
of his intention, cause and authority to arrest
him. Such notice shall not be required when:
(1)
There is reason to believe the notice
will endanger the life or safety of the officer
or another person or will likely enable the
party being arrested to escape;
(2) The erson bein arrest.ed is actuallv
enga9ed in t e comm1ss1on
attempt to
commit, an offense; or
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(3) The person being arrested is pursued
immediately after the commission of an offense
or an escape.
(B)

§77-7-6(2) waives its own requirement and does not

require "intention, cause and authority to arrest" if "the person
being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an
attempt to commit an offense."
(C)

There was evidence in the record McFarland struck

Avondet twice, knocking her down, and that after regaining her
feet, Avondet produced handcuffs and then McFarland declared "Ok.
Ok.

I'll go back in."
(D)

(Record p. 95).

Under similar facts and an almost identical statute,

the California Supreme Court held there was no requirement to
inform of "intention, cause and authority to arrest" in State v.
Beard, 294 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1956) as follows:
Defendant also contends, however, that the
officers failed to comply with Section 841 of the
Penal Code and the arrest was therefore unlawful.
That section provides: "The person making the
arrest must inform the person to be arrested of
the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the
arrest, and the authorit~ to make it, except when
the person to be arreste is actually engaged in
the commission of or an attem t to commit an
o ense, or is pursue imme iate y a ter its comm1ss1on, or after an escape." The record is not
clear as to just what the officers said to defendant at the time of the arrest and search, and it
may be conceded that there is some evidence that
they did not expressly inform him "of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest
and the authority to make it." Since the triai
court found, however, that defendant was arrested
while en a ed in the commission of the offense,
t ere was no v10 at1on o
ect1on
.
Id., at 30 (Emphasis added).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

Thus, the California Supreme Court held that its requirement of
"intention, cause and authority" was not applicable to the facts of
the Beard case because the person being arrested (detained) was, at
the time one would normally be informed, "engaged in the commission
of the offense."
In the case at bar, the Utah Supreme Court, has ruled as a
matter of law that the arrest for assault was improper because
Avondet did not inform McFarland, at the time he was assaulting her,
of her "intention, cause and authority" but what the Utah Supreme
Court overlooked, which is clear from the opinion since there is no
mention of it, is the exception to §77-7-6 that one need not comply
with the formal requirements and advise as to "intention, cause and
authority" if the person being arrested (detained) is "actually
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit the offense"
(assault) §77-7-6(2).

If the Utah Supreme Court will consider this

exception on rehearing, based on the facts of this case as set forth
in the record, the Utah Supreme Court will conclude that whether or
not McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an attempt to
commit" an assault at the time Avondet arrested (detained) him is
an issue that must be considered and decided upon.
If the Utah Supreme Court can rule as a matter of law that
McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit
an assault" at the time Avondet arrested (detained) him, then the
arrest was proper.

On the other hand, if the Utah Supreme Court can

rule as a matter of law that McFarland was not "engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an assault at the time Avondet
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arrested (detained) him, then the arrest was improper.

However, if

the Utah Supreme Court decides that reasonable minds could differ as
to whether or not McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an
at tempt to commit an assault" at the time Avondet arrested (detained) him, then the Utah Supreme Court should let the jury decide this
issue (under a preponderance of the evidence standard and not under
a beyond a reasonable doubt standard as imposed upon Skaggs by the
trial court in the first trial.
4.

Even if the Utah Supreme Court was to decide as a,

matter of law that McFarland was not "engaged in the commission of
or an attempt to commit an assault "at the time Avondet arrested
(detained) him, Avondet still complied with the requirements of

§77-7-6 as to "intention, cause and authority."

If this court can

infer from the actions and statements of McFarland
"She said I was free to go."
"! got up and left."

(P. 5 of Opinion.)
McFarland's "involuntary consent (acceptance) to be released from
defendant's custody" (p. 5 of opinion) and hence a waiver of his
right to be taken before a magistrate pursuant to §77-7-23 Utah Cod1
1
Annotated, 1953, surely, in all fairness and justice this court
should infer from the actions and statements of McFarland
She sot out her handcuffs
t said: "ok. ok. t' 11 go hack in."
(Record p. 95.)
McFarland's knowledge of Avondet' s "intent ion, cause and authority
to arrest," whi.ch under such circumstances, i.e. McFarland "actuall'
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being engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an
offense (the assault)," is not required under §77-7-6.
Avondet, after being struck by McFarland, produced a set
of handcuffs, which McFarland recognized and as a result, aborted
the notion of further physical contact.

Record, p. 93.

At that

point, McFarland was on notice of Avondet's intention to arrest.
Undisputedly, Defendant was then taken to the manager's office.
Record, p. 96.

McFarland at least at that time, was certainly on

notice of Avondet's authority as an employee of Skaggs and there,
McFarland was informed by Avondet as to the cause of the arrest
(assault).

Record, p. 98.

The reasonable inferences of these acts

are adequate notice to embody the requirements of §77-7-6.

There-

fore, even assuming the applicability of the formalized steps, it is
evident that McFarland was on constructive notice of each of the
elements as enumerated in the statute.
This is not dissimilar from an undercover police officer,
handcuffing, putting the arrestee in the patrol car, and informing
him of the charges at the station.
under Utah law, so was Avondet's.
5.

If that arrest would be valid
See State v. Beard, supra.

This Court remanded this case to the trial court "for

the limited purpose of trying the issue of punitive damages under
the newly adopted standard of actual malice."

In order to decide

this issue fairly, the jury should not be instructed that the
Supreme Court has already decided as a matter of law that Avondet
did not make a proper arrest because she did not advise McFarland of
her "intention, cause and authority to arrest" and thus the jury is
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only to decide if Avondet made this improper arrest with malice
(intentionally) or without malice (an honest mistake or lack of
knowledge concerning the law which a private citizen is charged witn
1

knowing,) but instead, this court should let the jury decide themselves based upon all the facts as to whether or not Avondet's
arrest of McFarland was proper or improper (i.e., if McFarland was
"engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an assault on
Avondet") and the jury should be able to decide this issue under a
preponderance of the evidence standard and not under a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard as the trial court instructed in the first
trial, which was the primary basis for appeal in this case (the
imposition by the trial court of a criminal standard in a civil
trial).

Thus, if the arrest was proper, award no damages; if

improper, award compensatory damages; and if improper and malicious1
award compensatory and punitive damages.

For this court to remand

this case for a trial on punitive damages only, can only result in
an implication by the jury that the Supreme Court must feel that
punitive damages are warranted in this case and the only question
the amount.
Based upon the foregoing.

Defendant/Appellant Skaggs

respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing.
DATED this

) ../.)-r day of February, 1984.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Peition For Rehearing to:

Findley P. Gridley
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Bruce R. Baird
4933 East Lake Drive, Suite 19H
Murray, Utah 84107
I .jr day of February, 1984.
postage prepaid this :2
~-

Stephen

G. Morgan
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